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SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS OF THE BAD DEBT
PROVISION OF THE FEDERAL REVENUE ACT
RANDOLPH E. PAUL
INTRODUCTORY

The desirability of rules of law depends upon their workability.'

In his

introduction to Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions, Professor Walter
Wheeler Cook has developed the thought that there is not the distinction sometimes supposed between theory and practice; that what does not work well
in practice is thus proved not to be good theory; and that a theory must be
tested not only in the abstract world of ideas, but also in concrete terms of
applicability to the actual conditions of life. 2 Our income tax legislation can
hardly claim immunity from this pragmatic test of value; on the contrary,
it particularly is supposed to deal with actualities and to produce practical
3
results.
The entire body of the income tax statute might be tested with profit in
the light of this principle of jurisprudence. 4 A general application of the
test being obviously impossible in the limited space afforded by a short article,
attention will be directed in this paper to an application of the principle to
the bad debt provision of the income tax statute5 and a consideration of how
that provision actually works in practice. The bad debt provision furnishes
'WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW (1929) p. 144.
2
Ho0FELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923).
Walter Wheeler Cook's exact
statement is as follows:
"'Hohfeld is an idealist,' 'a theorist'-these and similar remarks the present
writer has heard all too often from the lips of supposedly 'practical' men. Granted;
but after all ideals are what move the world; and no one recognized more clearly
than did Hohfeld that 'theory' which will not work in practice is not sound theory.
'It is theoretically correct but will not work in practice' is a common but erroneous
statement. If a theory is 'theoretically correct it will work; if it will not work,
it is 'theoretically incorrect'. Upon these propositions Hohfeld's work was based;
by these he would have it tested. 'Theory', to which he devoted his life, was to
him a means to an end-the solution of legal problems and the development of
our law so as to meet the human needs which are the sole reasons for its existence.
In the opinion of the present writer, no more 'practical' legal work was ever
done than that which is found in the pages of Hohfeld's writings, and it is as
such that the attempt has here been made to outline the more fundamental portions
of it, in the hope that it may thus be brought to the attention of a wider circle
of readers."
'Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445 (1930) ; Buck, et al., Ex'rs, v. Helvering,
73 F. (2d) 760 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934); Dudley T. Humphrey, 32 B.T.A. 280, (1935);
Irving D. Rossheim, 31 B.T.A. 857 (1934); Brown, The Time For Taking
Deductions for Losses and Bad Debts for Income Tax Purposes (1935)
84
U. oF" PA. L. REv. 41; Note (1931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 1072, 1077. Cf. judge Pound's
remark in Campbell v. New York Evening Post, 245 N. Y. 320, 328, 157 N. E.
153 (1927), a. privileged communication case, that we may as well "start with a rule
of our own, consistent with practical experience."
"'Things and results" are what count. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920)
p. 282.
'REVNUE: ACT OF 1936 § 23 (k), 49 STAT. 1660, 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936) § 23 (k).
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an advantageous point of application because it affects a wider group of taxpayers than do many provisions of the statute. It is a provision which is
availed of by small taxpayers as well as large. It is almost safe to say that
hardly any taxpayer filing returns reporting reasonably substantial income fails
to find it necessary, over a period of years, to deduct debts which have become
worthless. The need for working simplicity is, therefore, insistent. 6 While
many provisions of the income tax statute are necessarily complicated, 7 and
perhaps unavoidably obscure to the initiated as well as the uninitiated, the bad
debt provision can be made reasonably simple and workable. As it now
stands, it is not; and as it is perhaps necessarily administered, it imposes
the burden of unraveling wholly superfluous complexities upon already much
harassed taxpayers.8
THE STATUTE

The language of the bad debt provision of the Federal Revenue Act is
deceptively straightforward. The act provides :9
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: ...
Debts ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year
'Other things being equal, simplicity is certainly desirable: WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra
note 1, at 151.
'One needs always to be vigilant in defense of unavoidable complexity. Panaceamongers are constantly urging simplicity. The sooner it is realized that much of the
income tax law is inherently and unavoidably complicated, the better off we shall be. As
Napoleon said, simplicity and precision are to a degree irreconcilable. FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930) 310. In the preface to HOLMES, FEDERAL TAXES (6th ed.
1925), Mr. Holmes observed:
"The most common complaint against the income tax law is that it is so complicated. There is a widespread public demand that the law be made more simple,
there is at the same time much complaint against the hardships and inequalities
resulting from the inelasticity of the statute. These two currents of thought and
opinion necessarily produce a dilemma. It would be very easy for congress to
.pass a simple income tax statute. The 1913 Act, the first income tax law, was,
compared with the 1924 Act, a short and simple law. But if it had imposed taxes
at the rates now in force it might well have wrecked the industry and commerce
of the country. Any law imposing tax at high rates must fit into the complicated
commercial and industrial structure to which it so closely relates. The moment this
necessity is recognized and regarded, the law resulting must be to a large measure
complex."
As to the complicated nature of the federal revenue acts, see also: Helvering v.
Morgans, Inc., 293 U. S. 121, 126 (1934); Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and
Similar Practicesin Federal Taxation (1935) 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 1281, 1283; Magill, The
Too Well Remembered Man (1935) FORTUNE, XI, 100, 102; Magill, Trends in Revenue
Legislation (1934) 12 TAX MAG. 464; Lippman, Today and Tomorrow, N. Y. HeraldTribune, April 23, 1936.
The bad debt provision, in contrast with the provisions referred to in the -next footnote,
furnishes an example of badly needed possible increased simplicity.
'Provisions such as the reorganization provision, § 112, the installment sales provision,
§ 44, the provision as to corporate credits for purposes of the undistributed profits surtax,
§§ 26, 27, the provisions for the taxation of insurance companies, §§ 201-207, to mention
only a few of many available examples, cannot .be made too simple. All references are
to the REVENUE AcT OF 1936, supra note 5.
'Supra note 5.
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(or, in the discretion of the Commissioner, a reasonable
reserve for bad debts); and when satisfied that a debt
only in part, the Commissioner may allow such debt, in an
excess of the part charged off within the taxable year, as

addition to a
is recoverable
amount not in
a deduction."

The above-quoted language is, in practice, far from being as simple as it
sounds. Its administration has been speckled with many question marks,
many of which as yet have not been authoritatively answered. When is a debt
"ascertained to be worthless"? Does the rise and fall of the business cycle
affect the answer to this question, and if so, how and to what extent? By
what procedure is a debt "charged off"? When is a charge-off made "within
the taxable year" ?1o In the case of partial worthlessness, is the taxpayer
under compulsion to charge off the full amount of worthlessness accrued
during the taxable year or be forever precluded from the allowance of such
accumulated partial worthlessness as a deduction? Is a debt, secured by
collateral of less value than the debt, "partially worthless" where the debtor
is not responsible? Is the action of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in disallowing deduction on account of partial worthlessness subject to judicial
review?13 These questions have been a thorn in the flesh of taxpayers and
government for years. They remain, after a long period of administration
and judicial review, in large part unsolved.
The limited solution so far
achieved has been due to gallant salvage work by the Board of Tax Appeals
and the courts-work which at times looked more to the end to be accomplished than the means adopted, thus introducing problems perhaps more
serious than the problem solved.
A further question of importance arises when an attempt is made to co5rdinate the bad debt and capital loss provisions of the statute. This question,
involving the relationship of these apparently overlapping provisions of the
statute, will produce its share of anxiety in the next few years for taxpayers,
and perhaps in the end a fair aggregate of unforeseen deficiencies to be added
to a total of deficiencies which will strain tax-paying capacity. It is the purpose of this article to discuss some of these questions, and to suggest some
remedies that could be applied by a diligent 75th Congress to their solution.
THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE STATUTE IN PRACTICE
Returning to the proposition that the income tax statute, as well as other
statutes, should stand or fall by the test of results rather than abstractions,
let us examine in detail some of the difficulties and perplexities of both governm°See PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 28.27 et seq.
"The Board of Tax Appeals has recently answered this question in the affirmative.

American Fork & Hoe Co., 33 B.T.A. 1139 (1936) ; judicial review was early established by the courts in Stranahan v. Com'r, 42 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930)
cert. denied 283 U. S. 822 (1931) ; Magill, Finality of Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 563, 565.
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-ment and taxpayer in connection with the bad debt provision, and see how
specific problems encountered have been solved.
THE YEAR OF DEDUCTIBILITY

We may first discuss the requirement, with respect to wholly worthless
-debts, that the ascertainment of worthlessness must be "within the taxable
year."'12 It has been frequently held that worthless debt deductions cannot
be deferred; that bad debts can be deducted under the statute only when they
are ascertained to be W'orthless; that the deduction cannot be shifted, in the
interest of reduction of tax liability, to some year other than the year in
which the debt actually becomes worthless.' 3 A worthless debt, like a loss
4
on account of the worthlessness of stock, must be taken "now or never."'
The taxpayer has no option to choose the year of deductibility, but must at
Iiis peril' 5 deduct in the year of final worthlessness. The year of final worthlessness is a year when only an incorrigible optimist' 6 would continue to hope,
but it is not a year when a confirmed pessimist' 7 would cease to hope.

The

law calls for a fair middle course' 8 by a reasonable man.'1
Worthlessness, like its antithesis, value, is a question of fact. It may be
clear in some cases exactly when a debt becomes worthless, but in a majority
of cases the precise point of time when the worthlessness occurs is far from
certain, even after many facts are collected, and even in some cases until
extended efforts to collect 20 are made. In short, it is usually no easier to ascertain lack of value than to ascertain value, 21 and the difficulty of determining
value for income tax purposes is almost proverbial. In recognition of these considerations, the courts have developed the now familiar doctrine that there is
a large discretionary element in the ascertainment of worthlessness. A considerable latitude or margin for the play of judgment is allowed under this theory
22
to a taxpayer acting in good faith.
'Why is no ascertainment of partial worthlessness required as to partially worthless
debts? Does the taxpayer ascertain complete and the Commissioner partial worthlessness? Why any distinction?
"Avery v. Com'r, 22 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Katharine H. Putnam, 31
B.T.A. 241 (1934) ; Hiram R. Lloyd, 34 B.T.A. 301 (1936).
1
'Scherman v. Helvering, 74 F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935).
"Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Heiner, 81 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936), cert. denied
57 Sup. Ct. 9 (1936), rehearing denied 57 Sup. Ct. 113 (1936).
"oUnited States v. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U. S. 398 (1927) ; James L. Robertson,
20 TB.T.A. 112 (1930); Joseph H. Rudiger, 22 B.T.A. 204 (1931).
2 Macdonald Engineering Co., 35 B. T. A. 3 (1936).
'Thom. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 1039, 1040 (App. D. C., 1932).
"Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Heiner, supra note 15; Hiram R. Lloyd, 34 B.T.A. 301
(1936).
"See H. D. Lee Mercantile Co. v. Com'r, 79 F. (2d) 391 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935);
Steele Cotton Mill Co., 1 B.T.A. 299 (1925) and cases cited in PAUL AND MERTENS,
op. cit. supra note 10, at § 28.49.
'Proof of worthlessness requires the proving of a negative. See Worcester Bank
& Trust Co., et al., Exers, 13 B.T.A. 630 (1928); DeLoss v. Com'r, 23 F. (2d) 803
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1928), cert. denied 279 U. S. 840 (1929).
'=Duffin v. Lucas, 55 F. (2d) 786, 795 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932), cert. denied 287 U. S.
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Almost all debt charge-offs bring forth the same opposing contentions from
Government and taxpayer.23 In the light of the principles stated, the Government's sometimes ungenerous contention is almost invariably that the debt
claimed to have become worthless in the taxable year became worthless in a
previous year-usually a year as to which the Statute of Limitations has run
against credit or refund to the taxpayer, or a year in which the taxpayer had
no income or was in a lower tax bracket, or a year in which the taxpayer
could not comply with the requisite discussed below that he must have charged
off the worthless debt on his books.2 4 If these arguments fail, the Government will argue that the debt has not yet become worthless, though in years
of increasing rates or increasing income this contention may end in gain to
the taxpayer. It is infrequently admitted without a struggle that the taxpayer's debt became worthless in the year in which he returned the item as
worthless. On the other hand, the taxpayers are just as freely opportunistic
about their claims of worthlessness. Ascertainments of worthlessness have
an uncanny way of fixing themselves upon years in which the taxpayers
have considerable income which is subject to high surtax brackets, and of
avoiding years in which the taxpayer has no gross income against which to offset a worthless debt and in which, therefore, there will be no use in taking
the deduction.
The result of this conflict of interest 25 may be a stimulating game of hide
and seek, but it is more provocative of litigation than immediate revenue or
tax saving, and it serves to postpone with a hardly desirable effect the determination of tax liability and the settlement of cases. No one is to blame
for this result as long as the statute remains in its present form. Only an
"eighteenth-century faith in human nature" 26 would expect anything else. It
is entirely proper for the representatives of the Government to be zealous
to prevent the opportunistic juggling of bad debt deductions, and taxpayers can
hardly be blamed for attempting by way of deductions to retrieve some salvage value out of disastrous loans and extensions of credit. A realistic
treatment of the situation will not fly in the face of the twentieth-century
human nature of Government representatives and taxpayers' counsel, but in
611 (1932); Selden v. Heiner, 12 F. (2d) 474 (D. C. Pa. 1926); Clara Burdette,
25 B.T.A. 692 (1932), aff'd 69 F. (2d) 410 (C.C. A. 9th, 1934) ; Henry R. Huntting,
32 B.T.A. 495 (1935). See also Helvering v. Ames, 71 F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 8th,
1934); United States v. Frost, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15172, p. 1221 (1869).
'The same contentions are usually made in worthless stock deduction cases, and in
other cases in which a loss is sought as a deduction on account of the worthlessness
of assets. See, e.g., William Ritchie, Jr., 11 B.T.A. 607 (1928) ; Quito Electric Light &
Power Co., 10 B.T.A. 538 (1928); Humble & Gulf Coast Oil Co., 5 B.T.A. 328
(1926); Dixie Groves & Cattle Co., 5 B.T.A. 1274 (1927).
"As indicated above, the taxpayer guesses at his peril. See DeLoss v. Com'r, 28
F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1928), cert. denied 279 U. S.840 (1929), and case cited in
note 15.
'As to this conflict of interests, see Clapp v. Heiner, 51 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1931).
'Cole v.Norborne Land Drainage District, 270 U. S.45, 47 (1926).
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recognition of natural motivations will attempt, if possible, to remove the
cause of the difficulty.
NECESSITY

OF CHARGE-OFF

WITHIN THE TAXABLE

YEAR

Mental Charge-oifs
As indicated above, the statute requires, as a condition of deductibility of
worthless debts, a charge-off of the debt on the books of the taxpayer-not
merely a charge-off, but a charge-off "within the taxable year". This requirement is supposed to evidence abandonment and to constitute a test of good
faith.2 7 It is predicated upon the assumption, commonly known to be contrary to fact, 28 that taxpayers keep books. A large proportion of taxpayers
do not keep books. It has therefore been necessary to invent a theory of
informal charge-off where the taxpayer keeps no books of account. In such
cases, to avoid discrimination between taxpayers in the same situation except
for the fortuitous circumstance that one keeps books where the other does
not,29 the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts have developed the pious but
fraudulent fiction 0 that a taxpayer keeping no books may eliminate all debts
from his assets by a mental process tantamount to an admission to himself
that the debts ascertained to be worthless are no longer considered by him
to be part of his assets. It has been held that such a subjective charge-off
meets the statutory requirement. 3 ' "Thus the process of psychoanalysis has
spread to unaccustomed fields."8 2 This rule, that no actual charge-off is necessary where individual taxpayers keep no books, has been said to be "perhaps unduly liberal", but undoubtedly it would impose hardship to compel all
taxpayers to keep books 83 as a condition to deductibility. Certainly for ob"Fairless v. Com'r, 67 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).

'Wheeling Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 211 (1936). See also Provident
Trust Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 472 (Ct. Cis., 1933), aff'd 291 U. S. 272 (1934) ;
Farrington v. Com'r, 30 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929), cert. denied 279 U. S.
873 (1929).
'It is not to be concluded that book entries are unimportant. They may be extremely
important. Income is computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed by the taxpayer in keeping his books; such method of accounting frequently
helps to determine the time as to which income and deductions are to be accounted for.
The books of the taxpayer are, in short, assumed to reflect the facts, and, from the
evidential viewpoint, books, if they are kept, are far from unimportant. The point
here is that there is no income tax compulsion that they be kept. See PAUL AND
MERTENS, Op. cit. supra note 10, at §§ 5.07, 11.18.
'CAnozo, THE NATURE OF TEE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 116.
"Shiman v. Com'r, 60 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932); Squier, et al., Ex'rs, v.
Com'r, 68 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1933); Stephenson v. Com'r, 43 F. (2d) 348
(C. C. A. 8th, 1930),; McCloud v. Com'r, 43 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) ; Jones,
et al., Ex'rs, v. Com'r, 38 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) ; Peters v. United States,
10 F. Supp. 145 (Ct. Cis., 1935); J. H. Perry, 22 B.T.A. 13 (1931); F. A. Spencer,
21 B.T.A. 859 (1930) ; Robert Mitten, 11 B.T.A. 731 (1928); Guthrie Shaw, Ex'r,
9 B.T.A. 459 (1927); H. E. Newton, 7 B.T.A. 1153 (1927); see the discussion of
the Jones and Stephenson cases in the Shiman case.
"Cardozo, J., dissenting in United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 299 (1935).
'See Brown, supra note 3, at 65.
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vious reasons the courts do not wish to-go that far, and to keep from doing
so, they have been obliged to stretch the language of the statute to the limit of
flexibility, if not beyond that limit.
Charge-oifs Physically Made in Early Part of Following Year
The impractical requirement that bad debts, to be deductible, must be
charged off "within the taxable year" calls for even greater imaginative efforts
on the part of the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts, in disregard of what
every business man,34 as well as every accountant and lawyer, knows. It is
a matter of general knowledge that taxpayers do not close their books for a
fiscal period until a reasonable time after the period. They could not possibly
do so. Few corporations having complicated accounts are able to close their
books for a calendar year until February first of the year following. Since it
is obviously advisable for a taxpayer charging off worthless debts to await
developments through the fiscal period in which he expects to make a chargeoff, so that he may act on the basis of all possible information, it is nothing
short of absurd of the statute to require that the charge-off be made "within
the taxable year". As a matter of fact, there is no such requirement, though
the statute says there is: the courts and Board of Tax Appeals have smuggled
in the liberal doctrine that the phrase "within the taxable year" must be read
in the light of modern business practice, so that where a debt is ascertained
to be worthless within the taxable year, but the entry on the books is not
physically made until the early months of the next year, the debt is nevertheless deductible.8 5 In other words, with a greater sense of reality than Congress
86
showed in framing the bad debt provision, the Board of Tax Appeals and the
courts have refused to quibble over the omission of a charge-off within the taxable year when the debts were deducted in the returns filed the following
March.37 Here we have an example of how circumstances, which cannot alter
'See Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819 (App. D. C., 1936), resorting to the
"business man" test in a decision against the taxpayer. See United States v. Safety
Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U. S. 88, 97 (1936), rehearing denied 297 U. S. 727

(1936).
'Imperial Furniture Co., 9 B.T.A. 713 (1927); State Bank of Alcester, 8 B.T.A.
878 (1927) (semble); see J. B. Lewis, 19 B.T.A. 997 (1930) (dictun, semble); cf.
Rockwell Mfg. Co., 19 B.T.A. 277 (1930) (semble); Bank of Duplin, 12 B.T.A.
652 (1928) ; Coon Valley State Bank, 13 B.T.A. 132 (1928) ; Webb-Crawford Co., 10
B.T.A. 1172 (1928) ; Crystal Paper Co., 2 B.T.A. 596 (1925). See also Frank C.
Hughson, 10 B.T.A. 242 (1928).
"A comparable recent failure of realism is evident in the undistributed profits surtax,
which requires a taxpayer to determine its dividend policy during the taxable year
before it can know what its net income will be. Its net income may not be determinable as a matter of fact, until years later upon the audit of the return. See PAUL AND
MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 32A.13, Supplement; Stempf, New Factors in
Federal Income Taxation (1936) 62 JOURNAL op AcCOUN rA c 242, 247.
'See Fairless v. Com'r, 67 F. (2d) 475 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933). Here again the cases
run to esoteric distinctions. The taxpayer may deduct if the debt is ascertained to be
worthless in the taxable year but the physical entry is not made until the following
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statutes, may "help to fix their meaning" ;38 and we see how far the courts,
exercising a high degree of ingenuity, 39 may go 40 on a journey into the field
of legislation 41 to save a statute which, given a literal construction, would be
42
highly unjust and completely unworkable.
PARTIALLY WORTHLESS DEBTS
If the bad debt provision is analyzed with care, a further question appears
with respect to partially worthless debts. The first part of the provision refers
to wholly worthless debts; the second part in different language refers to
partially worthless debts. Under the first compulsory provision, the creditor
must charge off and claim a deduction for bad debts in the year of worthlessness 43 or lose the deduction. The second part of the statute clearly contemplates that the debtor shall first obtain the approval of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue before he may be permitted deduction for a partially
worthless debt. This second part of the provision has no compulsory language
requiring the taxpayer to see partial worthlessness as a deduction in any
particular year. The statute seems to leave to the taxpayer the question
whether he will seek a deduction for partially worthless debts in any year
44
prior to complete worthlessness.
This second part of the provision was inserted for the benefit of taxpayers,
the Congressional intent, no doubt, being to enable taxpayers, by means of the
deduction for partially worthless debts, truly to reflect their net income for
the taxable year. The taxpayer would seem to have the privilege under this
second part of the provision of abstaining from making a deduction on account of partial worthlessness until complete worthlessness transpires, with
the result that he may or may not in his discretion seek deduction; if he fails
to do so, he is not precluded from seeking deduction on account of comyear; he may not deduct where the ascertainment is in one year and the charge-off
is in a subsequent year. The income tax has enough unavoidable subtleties without
indulging the bent many lawyers have for refined distinctions-the besetting sin of
the legal mind. See SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (8th ed. 1930) 48.
'Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 91, 116 N. E. 782 (1917), cert. denied 246 U. S.
661 (1918).
,'Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 60 (1930).
'The facts did not quite refuse, as they sometimes do, to be twisted by interpretation,
forcing action by way of statutory amendment [see Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism (1930-31) 44 HARv. L. Rxv. 1222, 1241], but they were severely bent.
'See Echols v. Com'r, 61 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Piper v. Willcuts,
64 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) ; Fifth Street Building v. Com'r, 77 F. (2d)
605 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
'The consequence of adopting a contrary interpretation would, for practically all
taxpayers keeping books, virtually nullify the statute, which plainly was intended to
extend a helping hand to taxpayers whose debtors did not pay.
"Katharine H. Putnam, 31 B.T.A. 241 (1934) ; Hiram R. Lloyd, 34 B.T.A. 301 (1936).
"'See Clark v. Com'r, 85 F. (2d) 622 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936), for a case suggesting
this problem.
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plete worthlessness established in a subsequent year, even though there might
have been partial worthlessness in a prior year.
The question is further complicated in the case of debts secured by collateral. A creditor must exhaust security for a debt before he can take a bad
debt deduction.45 Is a secured debt only partially worthless as long as the
collateral has any remaining value, or is the difference between the face of the
debt with interest and the value of collateral the debt? On principle the collateral would seem analogous to the personal responsibility of the debtor,
perhaps an extension of that responsibility, in effect the definite pledging of
part of the debtor's assets to the specific debt. 46 If this is true, the whole debt
is the debt, and the debt is only partially worthless as long as the collateral has
47
Invalue; at least, it is not wholly worthless, if the whole debt is the debt.
dependently of the partial worthless debt provision, deductibility is postponed
until the collateral is sold, and the balance of the debt remaining unpaid by
the application of the proceeds of the sale may then be deducted, if the debtor
is irresponsible. 48 In any event, what a maze of uncertainty for taxpayers
who deduct and for government officials who must decide.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LOSS,

CAPITAL LOSS, AND BAD DEBT PROVISIONS

OF THE STATUTE

One does not reach the end of the complexities of the delusively simple
bad debt deduction provision within the four corners of the provision itself.
It is frequently necessary in construing revenue statutes to decide which of
two overlapping provisions applies to a particular situation.49 Inquiry is
therefore proper as to the relationship between the bad debt provision and
other provisions of the act.
"Peabody Coal Co., 18 B.T.A. 1081 (1930), aff'd 55 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931),
cert. denied 287 U. S. 605 (1932) ; City National Bank, 11 B.T.A. 857, appeal dinissed
in 35 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); see I.T. 1183, CB I-1 (1922) p. 155.
"It is stated in Regulations 94, art. 23 (k)-l:
". .. In determining whether a debt is worthless in whole or in part the
Commissioner will consider all pertinent evidence, including the value of the collateral, if any, securing the debt and the financial condition of the debtor."
"This seems to be implicit in the cases. See Equity Silk Corporation, 21 B.T.A.
1114 (1931); J. R. Young, 6 B.T.A. 656 (1927); Laurens Hardware Co., 5 B.T.A.
287 (1926).
OF. A. Spencer, 21 B.T.A. 859 (1930); Farmers & Merchants Bank of Nocona,
Texas, 10 B.T.A. 709 (1928); Kansas City Pump Co., 6 B.T.A. 938 (1927); Mt.
Vernon National Bank, 2 B.T.A. 581 (1925).
"Frequently the meaning of a statute may be determined by reference to the rule
of statutory construction, that no part of the statute should be permitted to perish by
construction. PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 3.07. This rule does
not help in solving the problem under discussion, because both the bad debt provision
[REvENuE AcT OF 1936, § 23 (k), infra note 51] and the capital gain provision
[REVENUE Ac oF 1936, § 117, 49 STAT. 1691 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936)
§ 117] have plenty of meaning wholly independently of the speciffic overlapping under
discussion.

BAD DEBT PROVISION
Here we find extraordinary confusion. The statute provides for the
deduction of losses "sustained during the taxable year". 50 Farther on in
the same section is the bad debt provision, 51 the principal subject of discussion.
To the man of the street there is no difference between losses and bad debts.
A bad debt is to him merely a particular kind of loss. But the provisions are
separate and the arrangement of the statute suggests the problem, still not
wholly solved after many years of income tax legislation and litigation,
whether this loss provision and the bad debt provision are mutually exclusive. 52 This question, as we shall see, is far from academic. The distinction
between losses and bad debts may be important enough under some circumstances to be decisive of deductibility.5 3 The problem has been acute as to the
status of bonds. After some early hesitation, 4 the decisions under earlier
statutes turned in the direction of allowing worthless bonds as a deduction
under the worthless debts provision, as distinguished from the loss provision. 55
The fact that bonds have been sold at a nominal price does not preclude
deductibility under the worthless debt provision of the statute. 56 It may be
10§§ 23 (e), (f), 49 STAT. 1659 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936) §§ 23
(e), (f).
la§ 23 (k), 49 STAT. 1660 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936) § 23 (k).

(1927), the Supreme
5In Llewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U. S. 243
Court avoided a decision on this point. In Spring City Foundry Co. v. Com'r,
292 U. S. 182 (1934), rehearing denied, 292 U. S. 613 (1934), the Court said
that the two provisions were mutually exclusive. This case was decided under
the 1918 law, which had neither a capital loss provision nor a provision for the
deduction of partially worthless debts. The debt was only partially worthless,
and the taxpayer, failing to be entitled to a bad debt deduction, tried to secure a
loss deduction. See Katharine H. Putnam, 31 B.T.A. 241 (1934).
"Losses are generally deductible only if incurred in a trade or business or in
a transaction entered into for profit, but deductible bad debts may have arisen
in a merely personal relationship. Furthermore, a loss is deductible when it is
See Porter v.
sustained, a bad debt when the creditor ascertains worthlessness.
United States, 20 F. (2d) 935 (S. D. Idaho, 1927), aff'd 27 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A.
9th, 1928), cert. denied 279 U. S. 875 (1928) ; and PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra
note 10, at §§ 28.06, 26.36, for a more complete discussion of this distinction.
"See Murchison National Bank, 1 B.T.A. 617 (1925); First National Bank of St.
Paul, 10 B.T.A. 32 (1928), remanded on stipulation 31 F. (2d) 1011 (C. C. A. 8th,
1929) ; A. P. Altmayer, 10 B.T.A. 1091 (1928) ; First National Bank, Parker's Landing,
12 B.T.A. 1387 (1928); West Lafayette Bank, 12 B.T.A. 1356 (1928).
'Continental Pipe Mfg. Co. v. Poe, 59 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Commonwealth Commercial State Bank v. Lucas, 41 F. (2d) 111 (App. D. C., 1930), rev'g
13 B.T.A. 467 (1928). See Moore v. Com'r, 1931 C.C.H., Par. 9134 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1931); Anna Bissell, 23 B.T.A. 572 (1931) ; South Hills Trust Co., 19 B.T.A. 674
(1930) ; Henry R. Huntting, 32 B.T.A. 495 (1935) ; First National Bank of St. Paul,
10 B.T.A. 32 (1928), remanded on stipulation 31 F. (2d) 1011 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
And see T. D. 3262, CB I-1, (1922) p. 152; G. C. M. 1887, CB VI-2 (1927) p. 61.
Cf. Carl P. Dennett, 30 B.T.A.
"Katharine H. Putnam, 31 B.T.A. 241 (1934).
49 (1934). However, the Putnam case is not at all clear on this point. It is possible
to distinguish between sales for a real consideration and sales involving only a nominal
consideration. In the case of the latter it may perhaps be argued that there is no
real sale, since virtually nothing is received on the sale. There is a technical passage
of title, but the sale in its ordinary sense may be argued to imply a transaction in
which something is received for that which is transferred.
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that Congress did not intend to place bonds and notes in the class of debts, 57
and it will also be noted that the regulations are permissive as to the treatment
of bonds and notes as bad debts. 8
So much for the ordinary loss provision. Under the 1934 and 1936 Acts,
the amount of gain or loss recognizable depends upon the period of holding
the capital assets sold or exchanged. 50 Generally speaking, the longer a capital
asset sold or exchanged has been held previous to its disposition, the smaller
will be the recognizable gain or loss to be taken into account in computing
net income. Moreover, the 1934 and 1936 Acts embody a severe limitation
upon the deductibility of capital losses: they may be deducted only to the
extent of "$2,000 plus the gains from such sales or exchanges". 60 On the
other hand, a wholly worthless debt, if allowable as a deduction at all, is allowable to the entire extent of the debt.0 ' These provisions accentuate the importance of the distinction between losses and debts.
Many creditors have seen fit in the last few years to sell debts at auction or
otherwise.6 2 The motivation of the taxpayer in these cases has been, no doubt,
to definitize the fact of worthlessness from the evidential standpoint; thus, in
a sense, the sale is a response to a Treasury attitude of skepticism as to claims
that particular debts are worthless in a particular period.6 3 It may be also that
a sale of a debt would constitute an ascertainment of worthlessness and be a
substantial compliance with the charge-off rule in the sense that the debt was,
by the sale, effectively eliminated from the taxpayer's book assets,64 and in the
sense that the taxpayer showed his bona fide intention by the sale (1) to
treat the debt as uncollectable, and (2) to eliminate it as an asset. 5
Taxpayers who sell debts may incur a substantial risk under the 1934 and
"But see Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d)

AcT

OF

819 (App. D. C., 1936)

and

REVENUE

1936, § 117 (f), 49 STAT. 1692 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936) § 117 (f),

referring specifically to the retirement of bonds. See PAUL AND MERTENS, OP. Cit. supra
note 10, at § 19.32.
"Regs. 94 and 86, art. 23 (k) -4; Reg. 77, art. 194.
"REVENTJE AcTs oF 1936, 1934, § 117 (a), 49 STAT. 1691 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A.
(Supp. 1936) § 117 (a).
"REVENUE AcTs oF 1936, 1934, § 117 (d), 49 STAT. 1692 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A.
(Supp. 1936) § 117 (d).
'The problem was somewhat different under the capital gain and loss provision of
the 1932 Act and previous acts, which taxed capital gains and recognized capital
losses on a different basis, capital assets being assets, of a description indicated in
the statute, held for more than two years, gains being taxable, at the election of the
taxpayer, at a flat 12V2% rate, and losses being deductible by subtracting 12V/% of
the capital loss from the amount ol tax computed without reference to such loss.
These capital gain and loss provisions did not apply to corporations. RE ENUE AcT or
1932, § 101 (c) (8), 47 STAT. 192 (1932).
'See e.g., Helvering v. Ames, 71 F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Katharine H.
Putnam, 31 B.T.A. 241 (1934).
"See text supported by notes 23 to 26, inclusive.
"Cf. In re Elaborated Ready Roofirfg Co., 78 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
"See Macdonald Engineering Co., 35 B.T.A. 3 (1936). For present purposes
questions involving the bona fides of the sale, particularly where the taxpayer bids in
the debt at an auction, are immaterial.
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1936 Acts.66 The risk inheres in the possibility that the Government may claim
that the deduction is not allowable under the worthless debt provision, 67 but
is covered by an exclusive capital gain and loss provision.
If this contention
should be sustained, the deductibility of worthless debts would be restricted
to $2,000 plus the .gains of the taxpayer from sales or exchanges of capital
assets. If he has no such gains, he would be allowed the deduction of the
debt, whatever its amount, only to the extent of $2,000. Moreover, if the
debt has been of long standing, a taxpayer having capital gains would be
considerably limited as to the amount of loss to be taken into account in
computing net income.
The question here is whether the bad debt provision69 and the capital
loss provision" are mutually exclusive, as were, for example, the bad debt
provision and the ordinary loss provision of the 1918 law. The Revenue
Act defines capital assets as "property held by the taxpayer (whether or
not connected with his trade or business)".7 1 Previous revenue acts also
defined the term "capital assets" as "property held by the taxpayer . . .
(whether or not connected with his trade or business)". 72

For purposes

of this question, the definition of the term "capital assets" is the same as that
contained in the act now in force. Certainly a debt 7 is property 74 held
"Under the REvENUE AcT OF 1932 and previous acts there was no limitation, as to
corporations, on capital losses, and other taxpayers were entitled to deduct 12327 of
such losses from the amount of their tax computed without considering the capital
loss. Under this provision there is, in effect, no limitation on deducting capital losses
unless the taxpayer is paying a surtax of over 1232%.
'REvENuE AcTs OF 1936, 1934, § 23 (k), supra note 51.
Professor Maguire of
Harvard University School of Law demurs, at least tentatively, to the preferential
treatment of bad debts. He is not able to see why a creditor whose debtor has
defaulted should be treated more favorably than a taxpayer who suffers a regular
business loss. Professor Maguire suggests the possibility that the original primary
reason for distinguishing between the two types of financial disaster lay in the fact
that there is usually in the case of a bad debt a less dramatic and objective manifestation
of disaster than in the case of at least some types of loss, such as the destruction
of goods by fire. It is certainly difficult to state any highly persuasive reason why bad
debts should constitute a more profitable deduction for taxpayers than losses; if this
is true, the argument will be made by shrewd government attorneys in favor of the
applicability of the capital loss provisions to bad debts which have been sold or
exchanged. One reason for differentiating between losses and bad debts, in favor of
the latter, may be that the taxpayer is in control to some degree of when he will take
the loss, whereas in the case of a bad debt worthlessness is determined by events beyond
the taxpayer's control.
SREVENUE AcTs OF 1936, 1934, § 117, supra note 49.
IREvENuE Acrs OF 1936, 1934, § 23 (k), supra note 51.
"0REVENUE AcTs OF 1936, 1934, § 117, supra note 49.
1§ 117 (b) goes on to make certain exceptions which are not relevant to this
discussion.
IWEVENuE AcTs OF 1932, 1928, § 101 (c) (8), supra note 61.
"In providing for deductions from income tax, Congress made a distinction between
losses and debts. Recognizing that a loss was a thing of the present, as, for example,
theft, fire, or embezzlement and the like, Congress provided a deduction of such item
in the current tax year. Recognizing likewise that debt was a thing of the future,
namely, a contract obligation to be later fulfilled, Congress provided that a future
reduction was to be allowed if and when the obligation proved worthless and was
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by the taxpayer. In common parlance, 75 bonds are regarded as capital assets,
and the same would probably be true of notes, and even of accounts receivable.
Where a debt is sold by the taxpayer either at auction or otherwise, or is
exchanged for other property, it is 'a serious question whether the taxpayer may deduct the full amount of worthlessness so established by the sale,
or whether he will be -limited as to deductibility to the extent indicated by
the capital gain and loss provision. This question will affect sales not only
of open accounts or accounts receivable, but also sales of bonds and notes.
It has been decided that the bad debt provision and the ordinary loss provision are mutually exclusive. 7 In view of the fact that the capital loss provision did not add any new items to the list of deductible items,"" but merely
limited the amount of the loss deductible in cases of capital items, it is fairly
safe to predict that the bad debt provision and the capital loss provision,
charged off.

In common speech, debt was regarded as created by contract between

a debtor and a creditor, or, as expressed by Blackstone, a sum of money due by certain
and express agreement." Buffington, J., in First National Bank of Sharon v. Heiner,
66 F. (2d) 925, 926 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
See Simon Benson, 9 B.T.A. 279 (1927); I.T. 2028, CB 111-1 (1924) p. 296.
"A debt is a legal relation between two parties," Holmes J., dissenting in Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 97 (1929).
'Justice Holmes refers to a debt in the case of Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles,
242 U. S. 7, 11 (1916), in the following language: ". . . which is property in the
hands of the creditor." See also State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 345
Ill. 160, 177 N. E. 702 (1931), where the Court says: "'Property' includes every interest
in any and everything subject to the ownership of man. . . . The relationship between
employer and employee with respect to unpaid wages is that of debtor and creditor,
and the right of the employee to those wages is a chose in action and as such may
be assigned."
According to FuNK & WAGNALLS' NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1923 ed.), a debt,
in legal parlance, is "the sum of money due either by certain and express agreement, or
established by a judgment of court as a debt of record." A right to receive what is
due can hardly be anything but property.
According to 17 C. J. 1374 (which lists many definitions of the term "debt"), there
is included the definition ". . . any thing had or held of or from another, his property
or right, his due, . . ." Various types of indebtedness, including open accounts and
bank deposits are listed in 50 C. J. 766, under the heading "Particular Rights, Claims,
or Demands," a subheading of the discussion of property, such claims being regarded
as choses in action, a classification of the broad term "property".
Cf. the flat statement of Mr. Justice Strong in Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432,
440 (1878): "Debts are not property. A non-resident creditor cannot be said to be,
in virtue of a debt due to him, a holder of property within the city."
"De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 (1919); Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit &
Investment Co., 297 U. S. 496 (1936), rehearing denied 297 U. S. 728 (1936) ; Mary
Duke Biddle, 33 B.T.A. 127 (1935) ; Percy- H. Clark, 31 B.T.A. 1082 (1935), aff'd
84 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1936.)
'Supra note 52.
G. C. M. 16793, CB XVI 36-8287 (1936), ruling that a loss on the sale of residential property, which had been held non-deductible previous to the new capital gains
and losses provisions, De Ford v. Com'r; 29 F. (2d) 532 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928),
Regulations 77 and 74, art. 171, was not deductible despite the injection of § 23 (j)
into the REvENUE ACT OF 1934 [48 STAT. 689, U. S. C. (1934) tit. 26], providing that
"losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent
provided in § 117 (d)," because that provision served only as a cross-reference to
§ 117 (d), and did not add to the list of loss items deductible under the act prior
to the addition of § 23* (j).
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as now constituted, wilU also be held to the mutually exclusive, as the latter
is merely an adjunct to the ordinary loss provision. It follows that a taxpayer
who attempts to secure a bad debt deduction, where he has made a sale of the
debt in order to obtain proof of complete or partial worthlessness, may under
this reasoning lose a substantial part of the benefit Congress may have intended
for him in the bad debt provision. Compromises of indebtedness raise
78
somewhat analogous questions.
THE DEPRESSION AND

THE BAD DEBT PROVISION

It has been said that the determination of debt worthlessness requires an
answer to a difficult and sometimes complex factual question. The rules as
to the establishment of worthlessness in the ordinary case, related to a
79
A great number
normal economic period, are to some degree established.
of factors enter into the determination of worthlessness, the elaboration of
which would undoubtedly extend unduly an article intended to discuss
merely new aspects of the worthless debt problem. The determination of
worthlessness bothers taxpayers under ordinary conditions, as the volume
of litigation on the subject shows. The cases now under discussion with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and coming to trial before the Board of Tax
Appeals and the courts, are cases in which the determination of worthlessness
must be related to an abnormal period of violent economic depression. The
cases are almost completely silent as to the effect of the depression in connection with determination of lack of value.80
"See Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. (2d) 819 (App. D. C., 1936). In this case it was
held that a transfer to the debtor of a note on which the debtor appeared as maker,
was not a "sale or exchange" within the capital loss provision of the statute. If this
is sound, the trapsaction would seem to be a "purchase", the note being analogous
to cash used in making a purchase. It would -seem to follow that a cancellation of
an indebtedness in return for mortgaged property would be a purchase; if this is
true, no gain would be realized on such a transaction, even though the value of the
property purchased was far in excess of the purchase price, the excess of value being
mere appreciation in value. See PAUL AND MERTENS, op. Cit. supra note 10, at § 5.10;
see also Imperator Realty Co., 24 B.T.A. 1010 (1931). But this does not mean that
there may not be a "sale or exchange" where a debt is transferred by the creditor to
a third party.
"'See PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 28.48 to § 28.89.
"'To some extent the cases treat the determination of value under depression conditions. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135 (1936) ; St. Joseph's
Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 39 (1936); Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan
Co., 8 B.T.A. 566, 579 (1927), referring to the "deplorable conditions of 1920";
Bonbright, Valuation of Real
Lamb Lumber & Implement Co., 6 B.T.A. 429 (1927)
Estate for Tax Purposes (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1397. The cases to some extent
also treat the determination of value under abnormally inflated conditions, see e.g.,
Strong v. Rogers, 14 A. F. T. R. 1207 (D. C. N. J. 1932), aff'd 72 F. (2d) 455
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1934), cert. denied 293 U. S. 621 (1934).
As to the effect of a moratorium, see Exchange National Bank, 18 B.T.A. 686
Cf. O.D. 891, CB 4
(1930); Richards & Hirschfeld, Inc., 24 B.T.A. 1289 (1931).
(1921) p. 173.
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judicial notice will, of course, be taken of the depression.8 1 The depression
began at the end of 1929. In its early period it was expected, like the War
in 1914, to last only a short time, and there remained for some time in the
public mind an attitude of substantial underlying optimism. Conditions became progressively worse, however, and in 1931 the -depression had attained
unprecedented proportions. By 1933, at the time of the inauguration of
President Roosevelt, both economic and psychological conditions were probably at their worst. Shortly thereafter a wave of half-suspicious -enthusiasm
developed which expressed itself in many ways, including a considerable
bulge in the stockmarket in the summer of 1933. This apparently returning
prosperity was a false alarm, and in reaction conditions sank to lower
levels, from which they did not return until fairly recently.
It is probable that many business concerns in the early period of 1931 and
1932 adopted, consciously or subconsciously, an attitude that many debts,
which under the temporary abnormal conditions prevailing might appear to
be at least partially worthless, were not so worthless as immediately appeared. Certainly such a forward-looking policy would have been justified
not only by the conditions at the time, but also by subsequent developments
Debtors might and did recover earning power; collateral might and did recover selling price. For a period debts may be said to have been in a state
of suspended animation. But such an attitude on the part of creditors could
not reasonably be unduly prolonged. Many creditors in 1933 felt that a
debt which had been stagnant for four years of depression and which did
not sufficiently revive to give further substantial promise in 1933 could
with propriety be considered bad. Some debts to some degree revived and
showed in 1933 a sufficient possibility of eventual collection to justify a further period of patient waiting.
This 1933 test indicated may be even more distinctly' applied in 1935
and 1936. While the deductibility of bad debts is always a question of all the
circumstances of a particular debt, there is a basis for a guarded generalization
that debts which showed no renewed life in the returning prosperity of 1935
and 1936 were by that token finally proved worthless.
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE STATUTE

The authorities referred to should be suffcient to demonstrate the necessity
for a clarification and amplification of the law on the subject of the deductibility of worthless debts. Part of the clarification will necessarily be statutory.
The changes indicated below are suggested:
s"Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 248 (1932);
F. (2d) 604 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
Citizens' National Bank of Orange v. Com'r, 74
conditions since 1929, see
For cases discussing the depression and the changed business
cases cited supra note 80.

BAD DEBT PROVISION
1. Omit the requirement8 2 that debts ascertained to be worthless must
be "charged off within the taxable year." This would do away with a part
of the statute which now is virtually a dead letter, both as to (a) the necessity
of a charge-off at all in the case of taxpayers not keeping books, and (b)
the necessity of a charge-off within the taxable year in the case of taxpayers
keeping books.
2. Make an exception to the usual statute of limitation upon refunds
and credits8 3 so that the taxpayer may claim credit or refund after the
expiration of three years after his return is filed or two years after the tax
is paid, whichever period ends last, and without reference to the regular
Statute of Limitations as to the amount of tax allocable to a bad debt deduction, where a deduction for bad debts is denied for the taxable year on the
ground that worthlessness in fact occurred in a previous year. 84 This exception
might also be extended to losses on account of the worthlessness of assets.
3. Co~rdinate more effectively the worthless debt provision and the
capital gain and loss provision of the statute, so that the respective orbits of
the two provisions are clearer than they now are, and so that it may be
known definitely by taxpayers whether a sale of a debt will be treated as
a sale of a capital asset, and whether the term "capital assets" is intended
to comprise worthless debts.
4. Eliminate the confusion now existing as to partially worthless debts
so that it is clear what is meant by the phrase "when satisfied that a debt is
recoverable only in part ' 85 and so that there is no distinction between the treatment of wholly and partially worthless debts."6
5. Some or all of these changes might be made to some degree retroactive, particularly those which will facilitate determinations as to the
worthlessness of debts during the depression.
"Now contained in § 23 (k), stupra note 51.
1REvENuE AcT oF 1936, § 322, 49 STAT. 1731 (1936), 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936)
§ 322.
"This exception to the statute of limitations would be comparable to the exception
formerly existing in cases in which the proper adjustment of tax liability was allowed
over a period of years when the Commissioner decreased the invested capital in one
year (thus increasing the tax), and the decrease was due to the failure of the
taxpayer to take proper deductions in previous years. .See REvEN E AcT oF 1924,
§ 281 (c), 43 STAT. 301; REVENUE AcT OF 1921, § 252, 42 STAT. 268. See also cases
cited in PAUL AND MERTENS, op. Cit. supra note 10, at § 51.26.
'This phrase is used in § 23 (k), supra note 51, with respect to partially worthless
debts, but not with respect to wholly worthless debts.
8'Under revenue acts previous to the REVENuE AcT oF 1932, the Commissioner's
permission to charge off a partially worthless debt was a condition precedent to such a
charge-off, as the statute had been construed in Com'r v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,
59 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932). There was considerable uncertainty under
the statute at that time as to whether the Commissioner's permission was necessary
before the actual charge-off, or only in the audit of the taxpayer's returns. The
RE ENuE AcT oF 1932 and subsequent revenue acts have clarified this situation by
unmistakable language, giving the Commissioner a discretion as to the allowance of
partially worthless debts as a deduction, but taking away his discretion as to the
taxpayer's charge-off of partially worthless debts.
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CONCLUSION

it has been said that a statute has to be drawn with reference to what is
"usual and probable."87 The bad debt provision of the revenue statute is
drawn with reference not even to what is possible or unusual, but rather in
large part to what does not ever occur at all. It is predicated upon the assumption that all taxpayers keep books, which almost everyone knows they
do not, and upon the further assumption that taxpayers keeping books
close their books within the taxable year, when a moment's thought is
enough to show such a closing would be impossible because no one could
know until midnight 8 of December 31st what income he will receive by
that time. No cognizance whatever is taken of the period required for
making closing entries, a period which in the case of a large concern cannot
be too short. No recognition is given to the simple thought of investors that
bonds and notes would be embraced within the term "capital assets," as that
term vaguely floats in the mind. A distinction is made in the statute, which
certainly is not prevalent in the minds of most business men,8 9 between losses
and bad debts. No realization is indicated of the obvious difficulty of determining the sometimes highly complex factual question if, as, and when value
disappears, a question frequently requiring detailed analysis which no one
can make within the taxable year and at the same time attend to his principal business. The result of this almost undiluted lack of respect for practical
considerations 0 is a statute which neither says what it means nor means
what it says.
It is therefore entirely clear that when the statutory provision as to the
deductibility of worthless debts is considered in "terms of things and results," 91 the only test worth while,92 it 'appears in its true light as wholly out
of touch with reality. It fails completely to express the intention of Congress
as that intention has been formulated in the decisions. However much they
may disagree with conclusions of fact in particular cases, reasonable taxpayers will quarrel with few of the interpretations so far made of the bad
debt provision. The point is deeper than that. The point is that the statute,
in its present form, demands that the courts, if they wish to reach a commonsense result avoiding widespread injustice, absurdity, and hardship," must
InPower Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 498 (1927).

"Cook

v. United States, 77 Ct. Cls. 343, 3 F. Supp. 47 (1933).

8See discussion of the relationship of the loss, capital loss and bad debt provisions

of the statute, supra page 204.
'See authorities cited in note 3. The Germans and French are more realistic
about debtors. In THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 28, Judge Cardozo quotes
§ 242 of the GERMAN CIVIL CODE, which states: "The debtor is obliged to perform his
service as good faith and regard to business custom dictate!" (Italics supplied.)
§§ 1134, 1359 of the FRENCH CODE CIvI. are to the same effect.
"Sitpra note 4.
=Cf. Llewellyn, Book Review (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 907, 908.
"HOLmES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 101, 102 suggesting the test of common sense.
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disregard the plain language of the statute. The courts must save us often
enough when we do not know the laws we pass, nor the meaning of the
laws we have passed. Where we know better and could easily make the
statute clear, it is an imposition upon the courts to place upon them the difficult and questionable task of ignoring, against established canons of construction, language which literally interpreted, or even interpreted with
some freedom not amounting to complete disregard, would produce results
assumed to be far from the Congressional intent.94
It is not only the courts which must depend upon the process of guessing
what Congress meant. The taxpayer must read the statute not in its lines,
but between its lines. Thus the law lacks, at a point of need, the element of
certainty. The bad debt deduction is almost universally availed of by commercial houses. It is necessary to suit this provision to commercial conditions.95 The need of certainty in commercial law has often been recognized.98
The "common man" 97 wants certainty, and where it is possible to give it to
him without sacrificing other values, he should have it. He has had misfortune enough when he has lost his money, and is entitled to protection 8
from the ambiguity that resides in the present statute and prevents him from
proceeding intelligently in connection with problems constantly arising in
his business. 99
It may sometimes be a wise policy 0 0 to leave well enough alone,101 but
it seems a dangerous practice to leave unamended a statutory provision the
plain meaning of which has to be disregarded in practice. To do so leaves
too much to the process of judicial legislation, necessary as such legislation
See United States v. Ryan, 284 U. S. 167, 175 (1931); Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v.
Com'r, 57 F. (2d) 1030 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932); H. J. Schlesinger, 5 B.T.A. 943, 945

(1926).

"See PAUL AND MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 10, at § 3.03. Here would be an
opportunity for Mr. Justice Cardozo's "intimate channel of connection between legis-

latures and courts." CARDozo, op. cit. supra note 90, at 64.

op. cit. supra note 90, at 13, 21; WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 33.
"CAPwozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1924) 111.
'See Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bounouville Co., 270 U. S.390, 400 (1926).
'It is sometimes the better part of social and legal wisdom deliberately not to
formulate rules of law. Cairns, A Note on Legal Definitions (1936) 36 COL. L. REv.
1099, 1104. This is true of such fields of law as negligence, and may be true of tax
"CARwozo,

avoidance. But in connection with the bad debt provision there is no need to prevent
escape from responsibility. The creditor-taxpayer is not a person who has chosen a
particular route to avoid tax; outside events have forced upon him results which
he is far from choosing. He needs help, and in addition is entitled to certainty.
"The present law, in adding uncertainty of deduction to the uncertainty of collection,
reinforces the lines in Hamlet that one should "neither a borrower nor a lender be."
'The economic concept of income, if adopted, would amount, from the viewpoint of
sound administrative procedure and convenience, to an "impossible rule"; the Supreme
Court therefore adopted a more or less arbitrary or nominal definition. Cairns, supra
note 98, at 1104. But the same is not true of the bad debt provision enacted in recognition of economic realties but in part disregarding those very realties. The arbitrary
character of the statute hinders, instead of helping, administration, so much so that
the courts had to come to the rescue.
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may sometimes be.' 0 2 Judicial legislation should be interstitial, "from molar
to molecular motions.' 0 3 The interpretation of the bad debt provision so
far made, 104 is, to borrow an expression of Mr. Justice Cardozo' 05 used in
connection with the delegation of the legislative function, liberality of construction "running riot." There are points beyond which judicial efforts in
the direction of saving a badly drafted statute should not go. When we go
too far in the direction of judicial legislation, we drive the judicial process
underground. No one knows what the statute means or what the courts will
do in fact in a given situation. 0 6 No one can know, for in the absence of
any rule, decisions can hardly help being little more than an expression of
the individual reaction, sometimes subconscious and unrealized even to himself, and frequently vaguely apprehended, of the particular judge in a particular case. As Jerome Frank ° 7 has shown, this condition obtains often
enough in the law without help from Congress by way of inertia or excessive
caution with relation to an ambiguous statute. It may be true, as the Supreme
Court has said, that a statute of uncertain meaning will not readily be made
an instrument for hardship and confusion, 0 8 but the anxiety which ends
in ultimate vindication in the Supreme Court (if one ever gets there) may
amount to the same thing.
Judge Learned Hand, in the well known Gregory case,10 9 employed his
famous metaphor that "the meaning of a sentence [in the statute] may
be more than that of the separate words," just as "a melody is more than
the notes." There was present in this opinion a stirring undertone of tax
avoidance. The same judge was not long afterwards obliged to say that we
u 0
"cannot play so fast and loose with the chosen words of a statute.""
The
'°Mr. Tilden has expressed this philosophy in his advice against changing a winning
game. If codification were too rigid it might do harm. Cf. President, etc. of Manhattan
Co. v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 150 N. E. 594 (1926), where the court was reluctantly
constrained to hold that a codification of the NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

LAW had

foolishly made invalid important business customs developing after the codification.
Business customs do change, as Mr. Justice Cardozo has pointed out in connection
with ocean bills of lading, THIE PARADoXEs op LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 13; but it seems
safe to depend upon the inability of business men to close their books, and make a
charge-off,
within the taxable year.
1
°"See CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 10, 98. See also
FRANK, LAW

AND THE MODERN MIND

(1930) Pt. one, c. 4.

"°'Holmes, J., dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221 (1917).
' 4This should be said even though that interpretation has been in favor of the
taxpayer.

"°'Concurring opinion in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., et al., v. United States,
295
U. S. 495, 553 (1935).
1
0HoLMES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 169, 172.
1
01FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
1
-Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172 (1934).
69 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934), aff'd 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
"'Com'r v. Manus Muller & Co., Inc., 79 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935), cert.
denied 296 U. S. 657 (1936). Cf. the doubts of Judge L. Hand, expressed in his concurring opinion in U. S. v. One Package, etc., and Dr. Hannah M. Stone, decided by

BAD DEBT PROVISION
notes may be undependable, but one may not wish to play entirely by ear.
The trouble with dependence upon free or liberal statutory interpretation of
a taxing statute is that no one can be sure when it will be employed. No
taxpayer knows today when some court may adopt in his case a strict interpretation of the bad debt provision of the statute. But even assuming that
liberality of attitude will be constant, taxpayers who have received the benefit
of a free interpretation, ignoring the plain language of the bad debt provision,
should not forget that what may be done by one court in disregard of plain
language to avoid injustice may also be done by another court to impose
unjust tax. The principle of departing from -statutory language cuts both
ways. In the case of the bad debt provision, the highly desirable elenment of
certainty, which might easily be attained, is gone.
Experience with many cases has taught us some valuable lessons for the
law of bad debt deductibility. The gains we have made may profitably be
put in the statute, so that we may return, so far as may be, to the practice
of respecting statutory language. There are plenty of instances of the
chaos that results when the courts, even for good reasons, vary from this
practice. Such departures, necessary as they are in certain connections,
encourage, if they do not put a premium upon, legal rationalization, and prevent certainty where it is badly needed and is possible. Judicial legislation
in the province of the bad debt provision has exhausted its function. The
legislature, now supplied with judicial advice, should perform its proper
function. Where a remedy is so clear and available, why not act?
the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, December, 1936, and particularly the following
language:
"Many people have changed their minds about such matters in sixty years, but the act
forbids the same conduct now as then; a statute stands until public feeling gets enough
momentum to change it, which may be long after a majority would repeal it, if a
poll were taken."

